Monetary
get and its judicious balancing of factors raising and lowering rates both suggest that no significant changes are expected or desired. If interest rates remain stable or rise during the current (growth) recession and recovery, this will be a unique episode in business cycle annals.
Stephen Goldfeld recently reported some carefully estimated econometric equations of demand for money.' Table 2 shows rates of increase of M1 needed, according to his preferred equation, for three alternative paths of interest rates in 1974. In each case Perry's forecasts for real GNP and prices from Table 1 were used. These estimates take off from 1973:4, when demand for money was unusually high, in the sense that there was a large positive residual from the systematic part of Goldfeld's equation.2 The 1. Stephen M. Goldfeld, "The Demand for Money Revisited," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (3:1973), pp. 577-638. Hereafter, this document will be referred to as BPEA, followed by the date.
2. I am grateful to Professor Goldfeld for these estimates, which are based on the specification in equation (4), ibid., p. 582.
1974 projections carry this residual with gradually diminishing weight. The residual for 1973:4, reflecting a shift of asset preferences toward money, is scarcely surprising. The same uncertainty and failure of confidence have been painfully evident in the stock market.
Goldfeld also has an equation for the time deposits component of M2, but it is not as successful over the sample period as his M1 equation. Using this equation, I calculated annual rates of increase in demand for time deposits for the four quarters of 1974, for the same three hypothetical paths of interest rates. These are also shown in Table 2 .
I conclude that the standard forecast-the administration target-will not be met without rates of monetary growth that will (a) exceed the recommendation of the council, and (b) draw screams from monetarists.
I am very skeptical that the standard GNP scenario can be staged without declines in interest rates at least as sharp as those shown in the third panel of Table 2 . My skepticism has three sources. As I stated above, I have no doubt that special factors will be favorable for investment in 1974, and, of course, it is possible that the stock market will pick up. Table 3 is meant to show that in the absence of special factors or a stock market recovery, investment demand might be weak. In my opinion, it is a fallacy to conclude that real rates of interest are low simply because current rates of inflation are high compared with nominal market interest rates on dollar-denominated assets. The important thing, as I have argued above, is the comparison of earnings prospects and interest rates. This is the comparison the stock market makes, and it is hard to argue that real rates have declined in any meaningful sense after price-earnings ratios have declined by a third over the year.
The rates of increase of price indexes do not represent operational investment opportunities; it is not possible to acquire and hold for future sale the consumer price index's market basket or a share of gross national product. Anyway, recent increases in price indexes have large one-shot components; rational savers and investors would not extrapolate those rates into the future. Inflation premiums are not immaculately added to interest rates. They are put there by market forces and monetary policy. Inflationary expectations do not force bond rates up unless they induce borrowers to float bonds and investors to shift into other assets. One would expect equities to rise in value. When inflationary news makes both bonds and stocks fall in price, the explanation, I think, is that these markets know that the Federal Open Market Committee reads the papers too and will react by making policy more restrictive.
I have lately been reading how money markets react adversely to news of high rates of growth of the stock of money. Perhaps the market is full of convinced monetarists. More likely, the market, knowing that the Fed sets targets and limits for growth in the money stock and is sensitive to monetarist criticism, anticipates that the FOMC will act restrictively to reverse "excessive" growth of monetary aggregates. This game is an unfortunate consequence of the Fed's adoption of money-stock criteria in making policy and of the market's use of these criteria in interpreting policy. But it does not mean that the Fed is impotent to reduce interest rates if it really aims to do so. Expectational markups of interest rates will not be sustained unless real live borrowers appear to take all the funds available, and this will not happen unless the Fed confirms the expectations by contracting bank reserves and supplies of loanable funds.
The Recommendations of the "Shadow Open Market Committee"
Tlhe press recently reported that the "Shadow Open Market Committee" advises the Fed to set the growth of M1 at a constant rate of 5 to 51/2 per- there is literally no way to end inflation that will not involve a temporary, though perhaps fairly protracted, period of low economic growth and relatively high unemployment."7
In one sense the Fed can be held responsible for all inflation that occurs. If the Fed were willing to starve the economy for liquidity, regardless of the consequences for real output and employment, presumably price indexes could be held down even when unit labor costs are rising or even when special factors raise the prices of internationally traded goods like oil and grain. But the Fed is not responsible for the structural features of modern industrial economies that give them an inflationary bias even at reasonable rates of utilization. Nor can the Fed be blamed for unwillingness to accept the "temporary, though perhaps fairly protracted" costs of trying to cure structural inflationary bias by deflation of aggregate demand.
We already know that these temporary costs can be fairly protracted. The rate of increase of the GNP deflator each quarter is the sum of two components. One is a weighted average of the eight preceding quarterly increases, the weights summing to one. The other is a correction depending on U 1, the unemployment rate for the previous quarter: the correction is positive if U 1 is less than 5 percent; negative if it exceeds 5 percent. ... while continued rapid inflation is not inevitable, the course of unwinding it will be long and difficult ... to hope that we can "wring the inflation out of the system" by the end of some short period is to assure disappointment. Whoever undertakes now to fight inflation must be prepared to stay the long course. We think it is necessary to do this, and also to recognize why we must do it. Experience extending over almost a decade teaches us that if we do not fight inflation effectively it will accelerate....
[The facts of our prosperity over the past eight years] do not relieve us of the need to bring inflation under control, and to accept the cost of doing so for the sake of avoiding the greater costs of an accelerating inflation." In the fight against inflation, the urgent matter in 1974 is to keep the fuel-food bulge in prices from escalating the rate of wage inflation. From the record so far, one can be moderately hopeful, and there are reasons why one would not expect rising commodity prices to pull wages all the way up after them. These price increases do not improve the bargaining power of most employees. They do not inflate the profits of employers or the value of labor to them; in many instances the opposite is true. They do not distort the pattern of relative wages and provoke another round of wage-wage spiral. Still, with George Meany talking 12 percent, no one would underrate the problem.
But I doubt that the wage outcome this year will depend appreciably on whether the unemployment rate is 6 percent or 5.5 percent or 5 percent. As I have already noted, wage equations that assign high coefficients to past price experience do not assign a strong influence to unemployment. The short-run Phillips curve is flat at high rates of unemployment. Since it is steep at low rates, a much longer time is required to unwind an inflation than to generate one.
In the circumstances, neither monetary policy nor aggregate-demand 11. Economic Report, February 1974, p. 21. policy in general is a useful tool. As Arthur Okun has observed, if there really is a danger that a one-shot bulge in particular prices will be permanently incorporated in general wage and price inflation, and if the damage of such acceleration is as great as the CEA suggests, then all kinds of preventive measures-controls, subsidies, rollbacks-would be justified, in spite of their temporary allocational costs.
Should not a real effort to negotiate a social treaty with George Meany and other labor representatives be the first order of business? I suspect that American consumers, wage earners, union leaders, and businessmen are quite capable of understanding that scarcities of food and fuel make it impossible for their real incomes to grow at the accustomed pace. Workers might accept wage guideposts for 1974 and 1975 that recognize this fact of life. But they would have to regain confidence that the sacrifices will be equitably shared. Indeed, wage guideposts might be more acceptable if workers were assured that the burdens of layoffs and short time were not piled on top of the inescapable burdens of commodity scarcities.
The abiding problem will be with us whatever happens in 1974. My views and values respecting unemployment and inflation are not shared by all economists. I do not agree that inflation, or even acceleration of inflation, is ipso facto evidence of excess aggregate demand. I do not agree that all unemployment up to the "natural" rate compatible with zero or steady inflation is ipso facto voluntary. Anyone who does agree to those propositions would have no qualms in aiming monetary and fiscal policy at the single target of zero inflation.
For the rest of us, the tormenting difficulty is that the economy shows inflationary bias even when there is significant involuntary unemployment. The bias is in some sense a structural defect of the economy and society, perhaps a failure to find and to respect orderly political and social mechanisms for reconciling inconsistent claims to real income. Chronic and accelerating inflation is then a symptom of a deeper social disorder, of which involuntary unemployment is an alternative symptom. Political economists may differ about whether it is better to face the social conflicts squarely or to let inflation obscure them and muddle through. I can understand why anyone who prefers the first alternative would be working for structural reform, for a new social contract. I cannot understand why he would believe that the job can be done by monetary policy. Within limits, the Federal Reserve can shift from one symptom to the other. But it cannot cure the disease.
